Abstract: The author argues that the deterioration of the natural environment in China provides a persuasive reason to reorient China's economic growth towards a more sustainable path. Reconciling the development and environment imperatives needs to become an urgent priority for the Chinese government in order to avert the cascading implications that will arise in terms of social unrest, loss of further development opportunities as well as deepening income inequality. This paper thus examines the inter-relationship between the current ecological challenge in China and the need for economic sustainability. It evaluates the extent of environmental damage in China and focuses on the environmental impact on development and social inequality. The paper then examines the recent legislative measures that have been taken by the Chinese government to address the problem of inefficient environmental monitoring. The author suggests that further reform is needed to achieve an economically and ecologically just pathway for China's future. The paper therefore demonstrates that the environmentdevelopment challenge in China is mainly a challenge of governance. Resolving it will contribute to better environmental justice and development.
Introduction
China's environmental degradation is unprecedented: indoor and outdoor air pollution is estimated to kill 656,000 Chinese citizens each year 1 ; what is more, well as deepening income inequality. The paper thus examines the interrelationship between the current ecological challenges in China and the need for economic sustainability. Section 2 goes on to evaluate the extent of environmental damage in China; Section 3 focuses on the environmental impact on development and social inequality; Section 4 examines the recent legislative measures that have been taken by the Chinese government to address the problem of inadequate environmental regulations; and Section 5 suggests further reform needed to achieve an economically and ecologically sound outlook for China. The conclusion summarizes the paper's main findings, demonstrating that the environment-development challenge in China is mainly a challenge of governance. Resolving it will contribute to improved environmental justice, 9 which is essential if China is to continue its path towards sustainable development.
Environmental degradation in China and its unequal sway
Despite tremendous economic growth achieved in China during the preceding decades, the impact of pollution, similar to the distribution of economic gains, is not felt equally across the Chinese population and territory -different communities bear the brunt of environmental degradation to different extents. Urban residents are mainly affected by smog and air pollution, while rural inhabitants have to also bear the impact of land and water contamination. 10 In a 2011 report, China's national Environmental Protection Agency stressed the transfer of heavy pollution from urban to rural areas, acknowledging the inadequate monitoring of pollution in rural regions. 11 The situation is also exacerbated by the persistence of the hukou system in China whereby certain social services (such as schooling, housing and healthcare) are restricted to the area of an individual's 9 Defined as "equity in access to environmental goods, and fairness in social processes dealing with market or government failures to provide environmental security." Richard Balme, The Politics of Environmental Justice in China (August 11, 2011) APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. 10 Zhong Hongjun, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, available at: <http://weibo. com/1974568711/C6PgZ9QzH>. There is another level of environmental inequality in China: The north/south divide, whereby 80 % of China's water resources is concentrated in Southern China. supra note 9, p. 10. 11 环保部：工业和城市污染正向农村, available at: <http://finance.sina.com.cn/nongye/nyhgjj/ 20120615/112312,323,556.shtml>.
Environmental Degradation residency registration, diminishing the possibility of geographic mobility. Reforming this system of population control could go a long way in reducing, at least partly, environmental inequalities between rural and urban residents as "it definitely draws the line of cleavage structuring the major pattern of environmental inequity in China." 12 The poorest members of the population who live in the countryside are also facing a foul paradox in that they bear the most severe consequences of environmental damage in terms of health risks, but at the same time, they are dependent upon these same polluting industries for their continued survival and income. 13 Environmental damage transpires to bear a direct correlation to the rising imbalances within Chinese society 14 and could hence be linked to another phenomenon: that of rising inequalities. According to Gini 15 coefficient statistics, China is the fourth most unequal country in the world. Rising social and economic inequality in China comes to show that despite the tremendous progress the country achieved in the past decades, economic growth does not necessarily trickle down to the most disadvantaged members of the population.
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With a specific focus on environmental degradation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate harm to the environment from harm to human health. Indeed, polls suggest that more than 80 % of the Chinese population perceive environmental problems as having greater importance than economic development. 17 The environment thus needs to be recognized as a public good, to which all members of society should be entitled, irrespective of 12 Balme (2011) , supra note 9, p. 16. Even though the author acknowledges that abolition, by itself, does not provide a universal panacea and more is required to reverse this inequality trend. The persistent environmental and social problems that have hit the most vulnerable members of society in China have resulted in a loss of confidence that environmental harm could be effectively contained. This has led to incidents such as protests and mass unrest. The number and size of social unrest cases have been steadily on the rise. 20 Yet, social discontent transpires to be a phenomenon that has arisen from China's own economic success. 21 Enjoying greater levels of financial and personal choice than ever before, the public now feels more empowered and requires greater levels of accountability from their leadership. When it comes to the danger to public health posed by environmental degradation, the rising middle class of China is no longer afraid to speak up. Economic growth, by itself, proves to be insufficient to quell the thirst of an increasingly more affluent and educated population for improvements in other aspects of society, such as better governance.
It will be hereby illustrated that the environment/social equity relationship is not necessarily linear, nor straightforward. Indeed, a truly sustainable governance requires tremendous investment in terms of capital and resources, which are often needed for other development purposes. One example is dam construction in China, which, on the one hand provides clean energy from hydropower, thus alleviating the impacts of climate change, 22 but on the 18 Even though it must be acknowledged that absolute equality is practically impossible to achieve. This data leads to the inevitable conclusion that China's double-digit economic growth in the past decades is not in reality that remarkable since it is largely being offset by pollution-related damage. 32 On par with direct GDP losses, there are indirect economic consequences arising from the transition to a more environmentally sound economy in terms of foregone revenue from polluting enterprises and higher costs associated with renewable energy.
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While acknowledging the problem is an important and necessary first step in the right direction, a much greater effort would be required to restore China's environment. This is exacerbated by the fact that Chinese energy demand continues growing, despite energy efficiency enhancements: "Cleaner as it may be, Chinese economic growth is also more massive, with an increase in energy consumption of 70 % between 2000 and 2005." 34 Historically, governmental and judicial response to environmental damage tends to be slow and, like in China, the "pollute first, control later" model has been followed in a number of now developed economies such as the UK, Japan and United States. 35 Indeed, economic considerations have often trumped environmental ones in policymaking 36 and judicial decisions. 37 The case for enhanced environmental protection only seems to arise after a certain level of economic development has been attained. However, as has been pointed out above, China can no longer afford to delay action. It needs to contain the widespread ecological collapse that has 2015%20newsletter+Version+A+CID_62da8195996a4285270638caadb8501b&utm_source= Campaign %20Monitor&utm_term=The%20US1 %20trillion%20cost%20of%20cleaning%20up%20Chinas %20cities>, accessed 26 April 2017. 32 There have been calls to introduce Green GDP as a measure of economic progress, instead of regular GDP indicators, but this has been resisted by local officials for fear of losing their regions' competitiveness: Kwan S. Kim et al. (2012) , supra note 23, p. 12. Indeed, resistance from regional government has led to the eventually indefinite postponement of the Green GDP project in China: Li and Lang (2010) 658, 666-67 (1904) where the court deferred to the economic and tax interests of the county in allowing the highly polluting activities of mining operators.
plagued the country in earlier decades, lest it spill over into the social and economic fabric of society. There is evidence that the Chinese Government has now understood that it is impossible to continue with a "growth at all costs" mindset and disregard the consequences that this growth brings. 38 Hence, a number of legislative and administrative measures have been introduced to tackle the product of rapid economic development. In respect to climate change, the Chinese government has taken measures to combat global warming, among which is the bilateral agreement with the 38 Indeed, whilst "pollution-intensive but cost-effective industrialization" has so far been effective in China, the country must alter its growth path if it is to achieve a sustainable economy in the long run. Kwan S. Kim et al. (2012) , supra note 23, p. 6. 39 The Constitution states that "the country should protect the environment and natural resources, and prevent pollutions and other public hazards" XIAN FA Article 26 (1982) (P.R. C.), available at: <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>. Even though the lack of constitutional judicial review (CJR) affords no avenue to enforce such provisions. 
Revamped environmental protection in China
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United States to commonly tackle greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). 43 Furthermore, GHG reduction targets have been set to address not only carbon dioxide, but also other potent global warming gases such as methane. 44 It is thus commendable that China has adopted a broad array of laws and regulations to deal with its environmental pollution challenges.
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Given these developments, it must be admitted that China's legislative framework has gradually improved and now provides a basis for detecting and containing environmental harm 46 [S]ince 1989, the National People's Congress has enacted at least twenty-four environment and natural resources related laws. More than forty State Council regulations, 500 standards, and 600 other regulatory documents have been produced concerning pollution control, natural resources conservation, and other types of environmental management. Yet, despite the achievements in the legislative process that lead to ecological protection, environmental legislation in practice is often perceived as overly broad, unclear and weak in terms of enforcement potential.
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Notwithstanding the improved awareness of environmental damage and its implications, the political response to this challenge is often muted by calls for stronger economic growth as well as the fear that environmental concerns will slow growth to levels that will destabilize Chinese political leadership.
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A number of significant challenges thus remain that need to be addressed before it can be truly claimed that China has developed an effective system that Environmental Degradation provides operational environmental safeguards. These challenges are to a large extent interconnected and will be addressed in turn below.
Remaining challenges and scope for further reform
The environmental situation in China has been linked to one of three types of failure that could topple the Chinese leadership, namely a "power supply" failure whereby the "economy [is] unable to move forward because it hits either a natural limit or an externally-imposed limit." 60 The other two types of failure represent "a hardware failure [which] refers to the breakdown of an economic mechanism and a software failure [that] refers to a flaw in governance." 61 Such failures are in turn seen as the result of governmental mismanagement and inefficiency. 62 It transpires that addressing these economic and governance issues is key to removing the roadblocks to a better environment in China. This paper is predominantly concerned with the so-called "software failure" stemming from a flawed governance approach, namely examining the legal challenges to improved environmental management. It is worth pointing out, however, that the other two types of failure related to the adequate functioning of China's economy are closely inter-related.
The Chinese legal system -A long way to go
It could be argued that at the heart of environmental mismanagement in China lie deficiencies in the country's legal and judicial systems. 63 Judicial training is lacking and there is a lot to be desired in terms of procedural guarantees. Judicial independence needs to be strengthened as contentious cases are often interfered with by officials who have special interests in prolonging the life of polluting enterprises. 64 Furthermore, the lack of an effective judicial review procedure limits the accountability and monitoring of preventable environmental harm. 65 In terms of procedure, legal penalties for environmental violations have been hardly sufficient to act as a deterrence mechanism. 66 In the unlikely event that a fine is actually levied, enterprises often receive the very same amount back in terms of a tax refund. 67 Environmental impact assessment rules are also insufficient in scope since they allow for "make-up" post factum impact assessments, defeating the very purpose for which they are required in the first place: precisely the need for taking proactive (as opposed to ex post) measures in identifying environmental risk. 68 Public interest litigation is further deficient in that the system is largely underfunded and understaffed, with very few avenues such as CLAPV for prospective litigants to resort to. 69 There are also numerous obstacles to plaintiffs during the court process, because litigation carries with it costs which are substantial and often unforeseen.
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These rule of law problems might be considered to stem from the reluctance of Chinese people to resort to the judicial system at all, since, due to China's emphasis on administrative centralization, administrative remedies are often seen as stronger and more reliable than judicial ones. 71 In addition, the traditional lack of a strong separation of powers system in China has resulted in an This structural rule of law challenge that China faces thus seems to derive from the blurred relationship between law and policy, whereby policies are oftentimes seen as the more significant methods of governance. 73 The present system results in high levels of uncertainty and compromises citizens' right to legitimate expectations. Hence, addressing problems related to the rule of law will be key in improving not only the environment, but a host of other pressing issues faced by Chinese society. In this regard, Erin Ryan advocates slow and gradual change rather than rapturous political turmoil as a means of reform. 74 However, when the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") is confronted with an urgent and irreversible problem such as environmental degradation, it must be capable of displaying leadership and incentive that will strike the right balance between the competing goals of environmental stewardship and economic necessity. In addition to establishing a strong rule of law where regulations are respected in practice and not only on paper, tackling China's pollution problem would also necessarily involve dealing with corruption 75 as well as the accountability of powerful state-owned corporations.
Corruption
China's political situation is particular in that environmental considerations often assume a secondary role due to the economic interests of special interest groups. This in turn leads to protectionism as well as an overemphasis on local authority revenues derived from the activities of polluting enterprises. (i) comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society; (ii) comprehensively deepening reform; (iii) comprehensively governing the country according to the law; and (iv) comprehensively be strict in governing the party.
In addition to the emphasis on the rule of law (albeit with Chinese characteristics) and sustained reform, these postulates essentially sum up some of Xi Jinping's greatest challenges: namely, achieving lasting economic growth, needed to lift millions that still live in poverty, while at the same time reducing reliance on export-led manufacturing in favour of a domestic consumption-led growth model. They also reflect an increasing importance placed on innovation. Corruption and legal reform are thus high on Chinese rulers' agenda, but it remains to be seen to what extent these issues will be resolved before environmental damage becomes overwhelming.
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5.3 "The mountains are high and the emperor is far away" -Changing performance incentives for better governance
Despite the fact that China is still a state with a strong central apparatus of governance, the role of local officials in legal enforcement has been on 77 Erin , supra note 65, p. 184. 78 These build on the 6th Plenum of the CCP aiming to establish a "harmonious society" by 2020, which is characterized by: -a democratic society under the rule of law; -a society based on equality and justice; -an honest and caring society; -a stable, vigorous and orderly society; and a society in which humans live in harmony with nature. 79 Julie Makinen, In Beijing, political pomp abounds as China kicks off "two meetings" (March 2015), LA Times, available at: <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-politics-twomeetings-20150303-story.html>, accessed 26 April 2017.
Environmental Degradation the rise. 80 China's local-central divide might indeed be among greatest obstacles that lies before reaching environmental sustainability. This is because local governors are seen as the "biggest power wielders, with the right to initiate new industries and enterprises and to control local finance, banking, commerce, and trade." 81 Commentators identify this to a situation that resembles "de facto" federalism, whereby there is an implicit or explicit bargain between local and central government regarding the prerogatives and responsibilities of each. 82 Undeniably, Chinese central government requires local officials' cooperation for the implementation of any policies and reforms it promulgates. The growing prominence and vested interests of local authorities, largely the result of their expanding economic clout, hence appear to be? among the major bottlenecks that impede environmental reform. 83 Conflicts of interest and economic considerations act as barriers which complicate the central-local government relationship. 84 For environmental goals to be achieved in practice, it transpires that local authorities' incentives need to be aligned with the imperative of environmental preservation. Yet, China's vast geography means that a centrally enforced environmental protection framework is not materially feasible, but rather needs to be complemented by strong province-level implementation.
Achieving local enforcement in practice is directly linked to revamping the performance and incentive models currently in place. Governance performance metrics in China have so far been over-reliant on GDP levels and economic success. This incentives structure risks placing too much emphasis on purely monetary indicators, while ignoring other equally significant goals such as health, education or environmental sustainability.
85 Officials' ranking and promotions and that are principally tied to economic growth often result in complications when environmental protection targets are to be achieved. 86 This means that short-term interests favouring expediency, rather than sustainability, frequently take precedent, as opposed to longer-term stability:
[c]ustomarily, during the year running up to a Central Committee meeting, local officials push for high economic growth in their regions by pursuing projects that can achieve quick, short-term results.
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It is true that performance-based promotion, where the success indicators are not solely based on GDP, 88 is more difficult to measure (as it necessarily involves the inclusion of qualitative factors that go beyond simply numerical results). Yet, this is critically needed if China is to adopt a direction towards sustained progress and development. The loss of GDP due to unsustainable environmental practices exemplified in Section 4 above suggests that China's economic house of cards is under pressure and may soon crumble under its own weight. The financial cost resulting from environmental damage could well be outweighing the GDP gains from economic growth. Thus, environmental indicators have recently been included in Chinese officials' performance metrics so as to incentivize them to take into account the impact of economic activities on the environment. 89 This is particularly pertinent when approving certain infrastructure Therefore, while economic growth retains a crucial role in China's policymaking, there is a new emphasis on social and environmental indicators. This is a welcome step that will hopefully shift the focus of Chinese governors away from a "growth at all costs" model 91 towards a more holistic approach of environmental, as well as economic, sustainability. To achieve these goals, enhanced public disclosure and accountability will be key. This will be examined in the following section.
The enforcement challenge, progressive developments and further reform
Section 4 outlined that while environmental legislation in China is becoming more comprehensive in scope, regulatory standards represent nothing more than a "paper tiger" in practice. 92 Weak environmental protection has resulted from the poor implementation of existing laws and the gaping loopholes left by a number of legislative provisions. One reason for this lack of implementation could be traced to the reliance of regional government officials on polluting enterprises for their county's tax revenues. This in turn creates a relationship of dependence on environmentally damaging industries. 93 To make matters worse, on market forces, whilst the latter require local-central government cooperation for enforcement. Jing Cao, Richard Garbaccio, and Mun S. which came into effect on 1 January 2015, stipulates harsher punishments for violating enterprises and includes stronger measures to hold local officials to account. 97 The new fine structure means that penalties are incurred during each continuing day of violation, as opposed to imposing one-off charges, which thus encourages more prompt compliance. 98 The reformed EPL also stimulates civic participation as well as bottom-up enforcement of environmental protection standards. This is done via a renewed emphasis on public interest litigation that can be initiated by certain NGOs.
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Perhaps, the most important revision of the EPL is the new role given to local officials to act as guardians of environmental sustainability. Regional 94 Zhongxiang (2007) , supra note 33, p. 36. This is complemented by a low level of fines that could be imposed, making the cost of pollution acceptable. 95 Yet, the limited enforcement capacity must be noted: "The Ministry of Environmental Protection, which oversees countless sources of pollution among a nation of 1.4 billion people, was staffed by as few as 200 employees in 2007." Erin china/article/1496236/revised-greenlaw-imposes-stiffer-penalties>, accessed 26 April 2017. Yet, there are standing requirements of NGOs being operational for at least 5 years before they can bring a suit, limiting the scope of potential challenges. One reason behind allowing expanded PIL (Public Interest Litigation) could be seen as the desire of the government to redirect social discontent away from mass protests onto more "legitimate" channels of expressing people's grievances (Erin Ryan 2013, supra note 65). Here, we witness an instrumentalization of the rule of law for different government purposes, evoking the notion of a rule by law instead of a rule of law.
Environmental Degradation officials can now be dismissed "if they are found to have covered up environmental wrongdoing, falsified data, illegally withheld environmental data from the public, or failed to enforce legally required closure of violators." 100 Further changes in the area of environmental impact assessment postulate that joint liability for ecological harm will be imposed on the persons responsible for implementation and supervision in case their duties have been performed in a fraudulent manner. 101 Thus, obligations are imposed not only on direct perpetrators but also on complicit government officials. Moreover, a specialized environmental branch of the highest Chinese Court (the Supreme People's Court) has also been established. It will be in charge of subordinate environmental tribunals. The creation of specialized environmental courts in China could at least partly address the problems outlined above as they would consist of an expert panel of judges that are more familiar with environmental problems, better able to deal with complex evidence and more prone to reaching consistent and less biased decisions. 102 However, it must be pointed out that a fragmented approach of tackling ecosystem problems is unlikely to produce sufficient improvement due to the multidisciplinary and interconnected complex nature of environmental issues. 103 One solution could lie in the establishment of cross-regional jurisdiction that overcomes local protectionism and fragmented cases. 104 The lack of geographic and financial proximity to the case would, expectantly, boost judicial independence and the likelihood of an environmentally friendly outcome. These revisions of China's EPL are regarded as a welcome development in Chinese environmental protection, as well as a sign of the determination with which the Chinese government aims to tackle pollution. Indeed, the government has declared a "war on pollution" in the same way as it once sought to eradicate poverty. 105 Despite these progressive changes, however, some outstanding flaws remain in the Chinese environmental protection framework. This could be partly explained through the enduring prominence of the State in China's economy: "the governments being asked to punish polluters are often the same ones that own the companies doing the polluting." 106 A lot remains to be done, and regulatory changes notwithstanding, environmental problems persist. One way that governments could resolve this dilemma involves "getting resource-pricing right to properly reflect resource scarcities and the costs of pollution and to improve [the] financial, taxation and legal system in order to encourage energy saving, environmental protection and development of renewable energies." 107 The "polluter-pays" principle could be an effective tool in identifying the perpetrators of environmental harm and holding them to account. 108 However, in the case of China, where the vast majority of pollution originates from state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"), this means that the state has to be able to in effect regulate itself, which is no easy task. Another option is to improve energy efficiency by removing subsidies to highly polluting factories and power plants. However, it is not straightforward to implement such policies, since there are various unforeseen consequences whereby the costs and benefits of subsidy cuts unevenly impact different segments of the population. 109 In this regard, providing effective compensation for pollution victims could be a key to resolving the environment-poverty conundrum in China. 110 This section aimed to demonstrate that while certain improvements have been made in the area of environmental protection in China, 111 clear guidelines need to be issued and implemented with regard to the impact on the most vulnerable segments of the population, particularly in terms of providing environmental compensation. The complications of political and economic challenges that arise from the growth-environment dilemma illustrate that the cost of curbing pollution in China is extraordinary. 112 This challenge could only be effectively resolved if China is willing to tackle head-on the problems that plague Chinese society through people-driven, robust and responsible policies.
Conclusion
Despite claims that China is in the process of entering a new rule of law era, 113 numerous weaknesses remain in the Chinese governance apparatus, particularly in the field of environmental protection. These have to be effectively addressed, and in a rapid fashion, so as to prevent further environmental collapse that can also precipitate a social and economic crisis. This paper has the objective of demonstrating the interconnected nature of environmental and economic issues, together with the need for comprehensive solutions. It illustrated that while legislative, jurisprudential and civil society developments are underway in environmental justice in a long-term perspective." Jing Cao, Richard Garbaccio, and Mun S. Ho also note that, overall, the beneficial impact of environmentally friendly policies outweighs the negatives (2009) 112 It is indeed a three-pronged human, developmental and economic cost. Kim, et.al. note that "These power plants are vital to rural township economies. If they were to close due to either excessive pollution or insufficient energy production, workers would be without pay or employment. Therefore, plant workers, plant owners, inspectors, and regional overseers alike all find it advantageous to allow excessive pollution" (Kim et al. (2012) , supra note 23, p. 8). Steve Chan also notes that when Chinese citizens are faced with the "food vs freedom" debate, they prefer the guarantee of a government that provides basic social rights: Steve Chan, China, there is still a lot to be desired before the environment-development dilemma can be fully resolved. The paper put forward a number of solutions to the environmental damage situation in China, such as: a more proactive regulatory framework; increased certainty and trust in the judicial system; an improved performance-based incentives structure for key government officials and members of the judiciary; achieving a balance of power between the central and local governments; as well as applying legislation in practice and not only on paper, among others. The present paper has therefore demonstrated that China requires cooperation from all sections of society if environmental quality targets are to be achieved: from top party leadership to local officials and the attendant citizen support. 114 This might be the most difficult trial that the Chinese government has yet had to face, as it does not involve "easy fix" solutions and requires coordinated cross-departmental action and robust governance at all societal and political levels. Let us hope the CCP is up for the challenge.
